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GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS: TAKING A LESSON
FROM HISTORY
George K. Yin*
OW should the tax system best respond to the problem of corpo-
rate tax shelters? To answer that question, the papers in this
symposium have sought guidance from diverse sources ranging
from the international experience with tax shelters,' the practicing tax
bar,2 moral philosophy,3 and the partnership anti-abuse regulations. 4 In
this paper, I suggest that history might also offer some insight-specifi-
cally, the history of tax shelter activity in this country during the 1970's
and 1980's, and the tax system's response to that problem.
As a threshold matter, this paper assumes that a serious corporate tax
shelter problem currently exists. Despite mounting anecdotal evidence of
one, there remains some uncertainty about it; so far, the empirical evi-
dence is quite skimpy. 5 Nevertheless, respected commentators both in-
side and outside of government seem persuaded by both the existence of
a problem and its significance. 6 Thus, this paper attempts to address the
next question: what should be done about it?
* Howard W. Smith Professor of Law and Barron F. Black Research Professor, Uni-
versity of Virginia. E-mail: gyin@virginia.edu. Copyright © 2000 by George K. Yin.
1. Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-Avoidance Rules,
54 SMU L. REV. 83 (2001).
2. Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Busi-
ness Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47
(2001).
3. Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines,
54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001).
4. Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership
Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159 (2001).
5. For a careful attempt to separate predictable explanations for corporate book-tax
differences from possible corporate tax shelter explanations, see Gil B. Manzon, Jr. &
George A. Plesko, The Relationship Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of
Income, TAX. L. REV. (forthcoming). See also Martin A. Sullivan, Let the Good Times
Roll: Options and Tax-Free Profits, 87 TAX NoTEs 1185 (2000); George K. Yin, Corporate
Tax Shelters and the Exercise of Nonqualified Stock Options (unpublished manuscript).
6. See Hearing on Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code Before
the U.S. Senate Fin. Comm., 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000) (statement of Jonathan Talisman,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dept. of Treasury); David Weisbach, It's
Time to Get Serious about Shelters, 89 TAX NoTEs 1677, 1677 (2000) ("almost everyone...
agrees that there is a serious problem with [corporate tax] shelters. The system is bro-
ken"); Canellos, supra note 2, at 48 (no citations necessary to establish the fact that corpo-
rate tax shelters are both proliferating and increasingly audacious). See generally U.S.
Dept. of Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, Analysis and Legis-
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Part I briefly describes the experience in this country with the last ma-
jor wave of tax shelter activity. It identifies many of the steps taken by
the tax system to curb tax shelters and shows that the steps were largely
ineffective until 1986.
Part II then explores the key lessons to be learned from the prior expe-
rience. It explains why a rule with the same characteristics as section
469-a broad, reasonably clear, outcomes-oriented rule-is needed if the
mistakes made in response to the earlier generation of shelters are to be
avoided.
Part III then applies these lessons to the corporate tax shelter problem
and outlines the advantages and disadvantages of two possible responses
to that problem. First, it considers the enactment of an "anti-abuse" rule
which denies a particular tax result if no sensible legislator would have
approved of the result at the time the statute was drafted. Next, it ex-
plores the possibility of taxing public corporations on their income re-
ported for financial accounting purposes, as adjusted by tax rules
authorizing specific deviations from that base.
Part IV contains my conclusions. I find that the uncertainty of an anti-
abuse rule would likely undermine its ability to be an effective deterrent
to corporate tax shelters. On the other hand, if the corporate tax shelter
problem is as serious as many now claim, I argue that a change to an
adjusted book income tax base for public corporations deserves further
consideration.
I. THE LAST WAR AGAINST TAX SHELTERS.
A. GROWTH AND DECLINE OF TAX SHELTER ACTIvITY SINCE 1975
This section provides evidence of the changing level of tax shelter activ-
ity engaged in by individuals since 1975. Because many tax shelter invest-
ments of individuals during the late 1970's and the 1980's were carried
out through partnerships, 7 the first two sets of time series data focus on
tax information arising from such ventures. This data presents the tax
items reported by the individual owners of the ventures and by the ven-
tures themselves. The third set of data then examines the level of tax
shelter activity as shown by the administrative impact of the activity on
the U.S. Tax Court and the IRS. Taken together, the data indicates that
there was a growth in tax shelter activity engaged in by individuals until
approximately 1986 and a decline since that time.
1. Data Reported by Owners of Partnerships and S Corporations
Figure 1 shows the net income or net loss reported by individual tax-
payers from their partnership and S corporation investments over the pe-
lative Proposals, available at http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/corptaxshelter.html (1999)
[hereinafter Treasury White Paper].




riod, 1975 through 1997.8 The total amount of net losses reported grew
525.8% between 1975 and 1986, much faster than the 136.9% increase in
the total amount of net income reported. The growth in losses is consis-
tent with an increase in tax shelter activity during that period. Beginning
in 1981 and continuing until 1986, net losses reported exceeded net in-
come. These trends reversed beginning in 1987 when net income re-
ported increased by 38.1% from 1986 and was greater than net loss
reported, which declined by 17.5% from 1986. During the period 1986
through 1997, the net income reported by individual taxpayers from part-
nership and S corporation investments grew by 307.5% while the net
losses reported by such taxpayers from the same investments decreased
by 22.4%. 9 The increase in net income reported during this period indi-
cates that the decline in net loss reported was not due to a reduction in
the amount of partnership and S corporation investment by individuals.
Rather, it suggests that there may have been a change in the type of in-
vestments made, from tax shelters to more economically-oriented
ventures.
Figure 2 shows the number of individual income tax returns reporting
partnership and S corporation income or loss between 1975 and 1997.10
The trend is similar to Figure 1. From 1975 to 1986, the number of tax
returns reporting net losses increased by 170.9%, much more than the
36.1% increase in the number of returns reporting net income. The in-
crease in the number of returns reporting losses is contrary to normal
market expectations and suggests that some amount of the losses may
have been non-economic or tax shelter losses.11 From 1986 to 1997, the
number of returns reporting net losses from partnership and S corpora-
tion investments declined by 35.7% whereas the number of returns re-
porting net income grew by 55.1%.
8. Since 1985, the IRS has provided data which aggregates the partnership and S
corporation income or loss reported by individual owners. Data from the 10 years prior to
1985 (when the partnership and S corporation information was provided separately) indi-
cates that the S corporation share of those items was pretty consistently between 17 and 22
percent of the total of each item. See IRS, Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax
Returns, 1975-76 (tbl. 1.6), 1977-78 (tbl. 1.3), 1979-81 (tbl. 1.2), 1982-83 (tbl. 1.3), 1984-97
(tbl. 1.4).
9. The difference between net income and net loss reported since 1986 is actually
more dramatic than these figures indicate due to a change in the reporting of tax items. In
1987, portfolio income of pass-through entities, such as interest, dividends, and royalties,
began to be reported separately by the owners of such entities and was not netted with the
other income or loss passed through to and reported by them. See Susan Nelson & Tom
Petska, Partnerships, Passive Losses, and Tax Reform, 9 SO1 BULLETIN 31, 38 n.15 (Winter
1989-90). Thus, since 1987, pass-through net income is understated and pass-through net
loss is overstated relative to the manner such amounts were previously reported and shown
on Figure 1.
10. The disaggregated figures from prior to 1985 show that the number of individual
taxpayer returns reporting S corporation income or loss was between 17 and 20 percent of
the total of each category. See supra note 8.
11. See Nelson & Petska, supra note 9, at 33; Tom Petska, Partnerships, Partners, and
Tax Shelters After Tax Reform, 1987-1989, 12 SOI BULLETIN 8, 11 (Summer 1992).
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2. Data Reported by Limited Partnerships and LLCs
Although Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the amount of tax benefits as
well as the number of individual investors reporting losses from partner-
ship and S corporation investments have declined since 1986, the num-
bers do not necessarily reflect any change in the level of tax shelter
activity. It is possible that the level of activity has continued at the same
pace as prior to 1986, with some overriding tax rule (such as the passive
activity loss rules) preventing the claiming of the resulting tax benefits by
the individual owners of the pass-through entities. Deductions and losses
passed through by the entities, for example, might simply be suspended
by the passive activity loss rules in increasing amounts.12
Figure 3, however, provides evidence that the level of tax shelter activ-
ity engaged in by individuals has, in fact, declined since 1986. Figure 3
shows the amount of net income or loss reported by limited partnerships,
the single most popular vehicle for tax shelter investments by individu-
als, 13 over the period 1981-97.14 (Data from LLCs is aggregated with the
limited partnership data beginning in 1993 when meaningful amounts of
LLC income or loss were first reported to the IRS.) Thus, this data
should reflect the type of investments made by limited partnerships dur-
ing this period, regardless of whether any resulting tax benefits passed
through to the owners could actually be claimed by them.
Between 1981 and 1986, net losses reported by limited partnerships in-
creased by 122.6%, or roughly the same as the 115.4% increase in net
income reported by them. In contrast, from 1986 to 1996, during which
time net income from limited partnerships and LLCs increased over
600%, net losses reported were essentially unchanged. These facts
strongly support the view that there was a shift in the nature of invest-
ments undertaken by limited partnerships since 1986, with a reduction in
the amount of tax sheltered investments.
Figure 4, which shows the number of limited partnerships and LLCs
reporting net income or loss between 1981 and 1997, is consistent with
that view. The number of limited partnerships reporting losses increased
by 36.1% from 1981 to 1986, somewhat similar to the 22.7% increase in
the number of limited partnerships reporting net income. From 1986 to
1995, however, the trend was much different: the number of limited part-
nerships and LLCs reporting income increased by 135.9% whereas the
number reporting losses increased by a mere 8.8%.
Somewhat surprisingly, Figure 4 also shows that between 1995 and
1997, there was a sharp upsurge in the number of limited partnerships
12. See I.R.C. § 469(b). All Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
13. See JCT-Overview, supra note 7, at 5.
14. For the precise definition of the items included in partnership and LLC net income
or loss, see Alan Zempel, Partnership Returns, 1997, 19 SOI BULLETIN 46, 58 (Fall 1999);
Timothy D. Wheeler, Partnership Returns, 1991, 13 SOI BULLETIN 80, 92 (Fall 1993). This
data is unavailable for periods prior to 1981.
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and LLCs reporting losses. "Loss" firms increased by 53.8% during that
period, almost as much as the increase in "income" firms (72.8%). To
examine whether this recent trend might indicate a revival of tax shelter
activity, Figure 5 presents the same data as Figure 4 except that the lim-
ited partnership and LLC information is disaggregated. Figure 5 indi-
cates that the number of loss limited partnerships, alone, actually fell
between 1995 and 1997 with the entire increase in the aggregate number
of loss firms being attributable to the LLCs. There was a dramatic and
almost identical increase in the number of LLCs reporting net income
and those reporting net loss, with each category increasing by almost
200% between 1995 and 1997.
To some extent, the LLCs with losses may be new, start-up firms with
the losses representing economic losses typically incurred by such firms
rather than tax shelter losses. Some support for this possibility is pro-
vided by Figure 6, which shows the number of limited partners and LLC
members of limited partnerships and LLCs reporting either net income
or loss between 1981 and 1997. This figure depicts the same pattern seen
previously-a 100% increase in the number of limited partners of loss
limited partnerships between 1981 and 1986, followed by a 36% decrease
in such number between 1986 and 1997. More significantly, Figure 6
shows that there was a relatively small increase of about 450,000 in the
number of LLC members of loss LLCs between 1995 and 1997. During
the same period, the number of loss LLCs grew by about 112,000 (see
Figure 5). These two figures indicate that most of the loss LLCs had very
few members, including perhaps many with but a single owner. This find-
ing is consistent with the hypothesis that the loss LLCs may represent
new, start-up businesses incurring economic losses.
3. Data Involving Income Tax Administration
Change in the level of tax shelter activity is also reflected by the impact
such activity had on income tax administration. Between 1979 and 1986,
the annual number of tax shelter returns under examination by the IRS
more than doubled from 182,731 to 426,634.15 By 1989, the number had
fallen back to 108,899.16 There was a similar change in the number of tax
shelter cases in the IRS Appeals Division. For example, in 1986, there
were 40,200 new tax shelter cases received by the Appeals Division, rep-
resenting approximately 44% of all new cases received by that office. 17
By 1990, there were only 4,824 new tax shelter cases received, or only
about 7.8% of the office's total new workload.1 8
Figure 7 shows the change in the number of cases docketed in the U.S.
Tax Court from 1981 through 1993. The caseload peaked at almost 88,000
15. I.R.S. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 27; Tax Shelters: IRS Settlement Policy Will Continue
Without Regard to Backlog of Cases, Chief Counsel Says, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, Dec.
8, 1986, at G-1.
16. I.R.S. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 14.
17. I.R.S. 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 58.
18. I.R.S. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 41.
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cases in 1987, a 93% increase from 1981. By 1993, the caseload had de-
clined back to roughly its 1981 level. Although precise figures are un-
available to show what proportion of these cases represented tax shelter
cases, it appears that tax shelters were a significant cause of the increase.
For example, over 50% of the caseload during three of the peak years,
1986-88, was from tax shelter litigation.19
4. Summary
The data contained in this section indicates that since 1975, there has
been a change in the level of tax shelter activity engaged in by individu-
als. The level of activity increased until 1986 and has decreased since that
time.
B. TAX SYSTEM RESPONSES TO TAX SHELTERS
During the 1970's and 1980's, all three branches of government were
very active in attempting to curb tax shelters. The legislative branch was
especially active. Virtually every major tax act between 1969 and 1986
contained one or more significant pieces of legislation designed to pre-
vent the proliferation of tax shelters. The new legislation included the
following:
* many changes to the substantive tax law, including significant tight-
ening of the depreciation recapture rules,20 revision of the partnership
special allocation rules, 21 and enactment of the add-on and alternative
minimum taxes, 22 the limitations on investment interest 23 and prepaid in-
terest,24 the at-risk rules,25 the straddle rules,26 the OID rules,27 and the
passive activity loss rules;28
* changes in tax procedure, such as enactment of the TEFRA partner-
ship audit rules29 and authorization of injunctive action against promoters
of abusive tax shelters; 30
* many penalty provisions against taxpayers or third parties, including
the valuation overstatement penalty, 31 the substantial understatement
penalty,32 and the penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters33 and fail-
ing to furnish information regarding tax shelters; 34 and
19. I.R.S. ANNUAL REPORTS 35 (1986), 36 (1987), 35 (1988).
20. See I.R.C. § 1250.
21. See I.R.C. § 704(b).
22. See I.R.C. § 55.
23. See I.R.C. § 163(d).
24. See I.R.C. § 461(g).
25. See I.R.C. § 465.
26. See I.R.C. §8 1092, 1256.
27. See I.R.C. §8 1271-75.
28. See I.R.C. § 469.
29. See I.R.C. 88 6221-6231.
30. See I.R.C. § 7408.
31. See I.R.C. § 6659 (included as part of I.R.C. § 6662 since 1989).
32. See I.R.C. § 6661 (included as part of I.R.C. § 6662 since 1989).
33. See I.R.C. § 6700.
34. See I.R.C. §8 6707, 6708.
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* new compliance, registration and disclosure requirements, such as
the reporting of certain real estate transactions, 35 promoter registration
of tax shelters,36 and required maintenance of investor lists by organizers
and sellers of tax shelters.37
In addition to working with the Congress in the enactment of the new
legislation and promulgating regulations pursuant to it, the executive
branch issued a number of interpretative rulings in the tax shelter area.38
The Treasury Department also adopted changes to Circular 230, the ad-
ministrative rules for practice before the IRS, to try to rein in more ag-
gressive tax practitioners providing tax advice on tax shelter
investments.39
Finally, the judicial branch was also active during this period, with the
leading tax shelter cases being Franklin's Estate v. Commissioner,40 Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States,41 Hilton v. Commissioner,42 Commissioner v.
Tufts,43 Odend'hal v. Commissioner," Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,45 United States v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd. ,46 Yosha v. Commis-
sioner,47 Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner,48 Rose v.
Commissioner,4 9 and Sheldon v. Commissioner.50 Important earlier
precedents included Gregory v, Helvering,51 Knetsch v. United States,52
and Goldstein v. Commissioner.5 3
II. LESSONS FROM THE LAST WAR AGAINST
TAX SHELTERS
A. THE PROBLEM WITH INCREMENTAL REFORM
The foregoing brief description of the tax system's response to tax shel-
ters during the 1970's and 1980's, which captures only a few highlights of
that period, explains why many observers have a strong sense of d6jA vu
regarding the anti-tax shelter actions being proposed and taken today. In
recent years, concern about corporate tax shelters has again evoked a
35. See I.R.C. § 6045(e).
36. See I.R.C. § 6111.
37. See I.R.C. § 6112.
38. See JCT-Overview, supra note 7, at 18-22 for a description of positions taken by
the IRS and the SEC during the early 1970's to restrict tax shelter activity.
39. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (1999).
40. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
41. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
42. 74 T.C. 305 (1980), affd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982).
43. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
44. 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984).
45. 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
46. 794 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1986).
47. 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988).
48. 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988).
49. 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989).
50. 94 T.C. 738 (1990).
51. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
52. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
53. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
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response from all three branches of government. The Treasury Depart-
ment has been especially active in issuing a host of regulations, rulings,
and other administrative pronouncements, 54 and several judicial decisions
have been issued. 55 Congress has enacted some new legislation56 and it
may be only a matter of time before more significant legislative action is
taken.
What additional steps should be done? There have been calls for fur-
ther modifications of substantive law, increased penalties, new disclosure
and other compliance requirements, and amendment of the Circular 230
standards, among other things. 57 Yet, as we have seen, many of those
same steps were taken during the 1970's and early 1980's without any
perceptible impact on the level of tax shelter activity. Tax shelters were
not effectively curbed until 1986.
There are at least two worries about repeating the types of steps taken
in response to the last generation of tax shelters. First, incremental
changes in the law intended to stem inefficient tax shelter activity may
result instead in greater inefficiency and distortion. This will occur if tax-
payers and the government engage in what might be referred to as the
Tax Avoidance (or "T.A.") game: The government first identifies a trans-
action or an outcome that it considers inappropriate and moves to pre-
vent it through some change in the law. If, subsequent to the change,
taxpayers still perceive the after-tax return from their desired outcome to
be greater than the costs necessary to achieve that outcome, they may
respond by attempting to circumvent the change in law. For example,
they may explore alternative means of achieving their desired outcome
which may be less direct and more expensive than the original technique,
yet still worthwhile. Or, they may discover and try to take advantage of
crevices in the new law to reach their original goal or attain an even bet-
ter one.58 The government eventually discovers and responds to these
54. See, e.g., Not. 2000-61, 2000 WL 1729184; Not. 2000-6, 2000 WL 1720833; Not.
2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 1; T.D. 8875, 2000-11 I.R.B. 761; T.D. 8876, 2000-11 I.R.B. 753;
T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.R.B. 747; Ann. 2000-51, 2000-22 I.R.B. 1141; Ann. 2000-12, 2000-12
I.R.B. 835; Not. 2000-15, 2000-12 I.R.B. 826; Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-11 I.R.B. 744; T.D.
8853, 2000-4 I.R.B. 377; Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-13 I.R.B. 3; Not. 99-59, 1999-52 I.R.B. 761;
Not. 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334.
55. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r., 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); ASA Invester-
ings P'ship v. Comm'r., 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), affd, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 171 (2000); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r., 113 T.C. 214
(1999); Winn-Dixie Stores v. Comm'r., 113 T.C. 254 (1999); UPS v. Comm'r., 78 T.C.M.
(CCH) 262 (1999); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684 (1999); Salina P'ship LP
v. Comm'r., 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000).
56. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 332(c), 357(c), (d), 732(c), (f), 1259, 1260.
57. For descriptions of some current proposals, see Treasury White Paper, supra note
6, at 78-114; Dept. of Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year
2001 Revenue Proposals 122-38 (2000); U.S. J. Comm. on Tax'n, Study of Present-Law
Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Including Provisions Relating to Corporate
Tax Shelters), JCS-3-99, 232-59 (1999).
58. Cf. Cooper, supra note 2.
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efforts, and the game continues. 59
The T.A. game is inefficient for several reasons. First, the basic activity
that the government was trying to deter in the first place has not been
curbed. Thus, if the government's objection to the activity was based on
its inefficient consequences, that inefficiency has not been avoided. Sec-
ondly, the government's intervention, though ultimately unsuccessful,
nevertheless causes the taxpayer to achieve its desired outcome in a less
efficient manner. The taxpayer still accomplishes what the government
objects to, but the taxpayer simply has to incur greater unproductive costs
in reaching its desired end. Finally, the government has to incur adminis-
trative costs to discover what the taxpayer has done and to enforce the
law or implement a new one.
Incremental change produces a second worry, one quite visible from
the experience from the 1970's and 1980's. Even after the "war" is finally
won, the incremental steps taken along the way, many of which having
proven to be largely ineffective, remain as part of the law. It is like the
detritus left on the battlefield after a major conflict. It has proven to be
extremely difficult to clean out the underbrush of unnecessary tax laws
once their time has passed. Instead, the underbrush remains as simply a
lingering cost of the tax system and the earlier war, rules that must be
navigated around by the well-advised and that stay behind to trip up the
ill-advised. Arguably, two current examples of this underbrush emanat-
ing from the 1970's are the alternative minimum tax and the at risk rules.
By contrast, the experience since 1986 illustrates the potential advan-
tage of taking a bold step to stem the undesired activity. Once the tipping
point is reached, the T.A. game is over.6° Taxpayers stop trying to engage
in the activity because the cost of doing so is too great, the reward is too
small, or both. As a result, efficiency is gained not only because the inef-
ficient activity itself is stopped, but also because the transactions costs to
participate in or monitor and prevent the activity are avoided. The "bold
step" may be quite complex, but if its consequence is to deter the
targeted activity altogether, the net result may be a considerable simplifi-
cation for the tax system and a reduction in costs. 61
59. David Weisbach refers to this phenomenon as the "distortionary effect" of anti-tax
avoidance rules, and David Schizer calls it the "planning option." See David A. Weisbach,
An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Laws, AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming);
David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning,
73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1339, 1344, 1348-51 (2000); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Sub-
stance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAx NoTEs 221, 222-23 (2000)
(describing how one possible response to anti-tax avoidance rules is for the taxpayer to
assume greater risks and incur greater costs without any corresponding benefit to anyone).
60. As Prof. Weisbach describes, if the anti-tax avoidance rule is strong enough, the
distortionary effect begins to decrease because the number of taxpayers who continue to
try to engage in the avoidance activity declines. See Weisbach, supra note 59; see also
Shaviro, supra note 59, at 223 (objective of anti-tax avoidance rule is to deter the undesir-
able activity altogether).
61. See Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive Activity Limitations: Can Com-
plexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97, 106 (1989); Jerome Kurtz, The Interest Deduction
under Our Hybrid Tax System: Muddling Toward Accommodation, 50 TAX L. REv. 153,
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To be sure, incremental change offers the possible benefit of preventing
the other type of error - adoption of a rule which overreaches and inter-
feres with market transactions for no good purpose. An overbroad rule
may also present greater equity objections than one that is too ineffec-
tual. Nevertheless, if there is one lesson to be learned from the tax shel-
ter experience of the 1970's and 1980's, it is the extent to which taxpayers
are willing to play the T.A. game. Thus, if corporate tax shelters are as
significant a problem as some now proclaim, policymakers should give
serious consideration to bold responses. 62
B. WHAT STOPPED THE LAST GENERATION OF TAX
SHELTERS, AND WHY?
It is difficult to know exactly what has caused tax shelter activity en-
gaged in by individuals to recede since 1986. Non-tax economic condi-
tions may be a factor, although this country has experienced a variety of
conditions since then with no resurrection of the tax shelters. One or
more of the tax changes leading up to and included as part of the 1986
Act certainly have been factors. It seems hardly a coincidence that shel-
ters have been reduced since 1986.
The 1986 Act contained many important tax changes, as did the 1982
and 1984 Acts immediately preceding it. It has been suggested that tax
shelters were curbed as a result of the combination of the following major
changes enacted in 1986: the lowering of income tax rates, which reduced
the return from tax shelters; the elimination of the capital gains prefer-
ence; the lengthening of depreciation schedules; and enactment of section
469-the passive activity loss rules. 63 But since 1986, income tax rates
have risen, and the capital gains preference has returned, without any
apparent resumption of the sheltering activity common prior to that time.
Depreciation schedules have also been subject to change from time to
time, although there have been no significant changes since 1986. New
tax preferences have been enacted since 1986. One important constant
throughout has been section 469. Although there is some difference of
opinion, the consensus is that the passive activity loss rules have been a
major factor, if not the single most critical factor, in the curbing of tax
223-34 (1995); Cecily W. Rock & Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Losses and the Improvement
of Net Income Measurement, 7 VA. TAx REV. 1, 52 (1987); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Effi-
ciency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48
TAx L. REV. 1, 36 (1992). Some early commentary criticizing the complexity of the passive
activity loss rules may have overlooked this simplifying potential of those rules. See
Michael A. Oberst, The Passive Activity Provisions-A Tax Policy Blooper, 40 U. FLA. L.
REV. 641, 683 (1988); Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss
Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 95-102 (1988). A taxpayer with a large amount of earned
income can avoid the complexities of complying with section 469 simply by curtailing his or
her investments in limited partnerships and other vehicles generating passive losses. For a
recent article again criticizing the complexity of section 469, see Mona L. Hymel, Tax Pol-
icy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 615, 641-43 (1998).
62. Cf. Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Tax Shelters, 1997 and 1998, 81 TAX NOTEs 1603,
1605-06 (1998).




Why has section 469 proven to be so effective? Certainly, the breadth
and relative clarity of the rule are possible explanations. Although the
meaning of the rule in any given case may be difficult to ascertain, its
application to the mass of transactions that the government wished to
deter has been plain enough.
Another possible explanation is that the rule is outcomes-oriented. In
general, it is not concerned with which provision or provisions produce
the particular tax consequences being claimed. It is not concerned with
whether the taxpayer's activities are undertaken for valid business pur-
poses or tax avoidance purposes, or with any other particular motive or
intent. It is not concerned with how the amount of tax savings resulting
from a transaction compares to its pre-tax economic return. Section 469
operates to prohibit or constrain certain outcomes, however they may be
achieved and for whatever reason.
Section 469 has been much criticized in the literature on policy
grounds. 65 Although I disagree with certain of the criticisms, the point
here is not to debate the merits of that particular rule. Section 469, for
example, could not be easily adapted to apply to public corporations any-
way.66 Rather, what is important is to observe the rule's positive effect
on curbing the last generation of tax shelters, to identify the characteris-
tics that have made it so effective, and to consider whether a rule with
similar characteristics might be equally effective at curtailing corporate
tax shelters. The next part discusses two possible section 469 clones.
64. See Calvin H. Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation? A Response to
Professor Zelenak, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 591, 625 (1989); Calvin H. Johnson, What's a Tax
Shelter?, 68 TAX NoTEs 879, 880 (1995); Koppelman, supra note 61, at 105; Kurtz, supra
note 61, at 221-23; Rock & Shaviro, supra note 61, at 3. The principal view to the contrary
is that section 469 was ultimately unnecessary; other changes would eventually have curbed
tax shelters. See Hymel, supra note 61, at 622, 625; Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Prefer-
ences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 499, 526-27 (1989). We may never know for sure which view is
correct. Nevertheless, given the broad consensus regarding the undesirability of shelter
activity, the huge strain it was placing on the tax system, and the evident success of section
469 in ending shelters after many failed efforts, there should be a heavy burden on those
who would repeal section 469 on the theory that it is not needed.
It should be noted that section 469 merely defers losses; it does not disallow them alto-
gether. See I.R.C. § 469(b). Lengthening depreciation schedules has the same general ef-
fect. Thus, the fact that there seems to have been a reduction, and not a mere deferral, in
the amount of losses from limited partnerships and LLCs since 1986 (see Figure 3) is fur-
ther evidence of a change in the nature of the investments undertaken by those entities.
65. See Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal
of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. Rzv. 15 (1989); Hymel, supra note 61; Oberst,
supra note 61; Peroni, supra note 61; Zelenak, supra note 64.
66. See Treasury White Paper, supra note 6, at 120.
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III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE CORPORATE TAX
SHELTER PROBLEM
Does a solution exist that might have an effect on corporate tax shel-
ters comparable to the one section 469 apparently has had on the last
generation of shelters? This part briefly explores two possibilities.
A. AN "ANTI-ABUsE" RULE
Consider first an "anti-abuse" rule of the type described by Professor
Gunn: a rule that denies a tax result from a particular transaction if no
sensible legislator would have approved of the result at the time the stat-
ute was drafted.67 The breadth of this rule is evident. It is also outcomes-
oriented. The focus of the rule is on the result achieved, not the manner
in which the result is attained. The particular elements producing the
claimed result, including the taxpayer's purpose or intent, are irrelevant
except insofar as the elements shed light on the reaction of a sensible
legislator to the overall result.
It is useful to compare an outcomes-oriented rule such as this with one
that is means-oriented, such as codification of the business purpose doc-
trine.68 An outcomes-oriented rule might well be preferred by tax practi-
tioners over a means-oriented one. The reason is that the basic building
blocks-the means-of both tax shelters and "real transactions" 69 may be
quite similar, distinguished only by relatively subtle nuances. Thus, a
means-oriented rule, particularly if codified in the statute rather than left
to a case-by-case determination by the courts, may be used against too
broad a scope of transactions. 70
But how clear is an anti-abuse rule of the type mentioned above? Pe-
ter Canellos asserts that the distinction between a tax shelter and an ag-
gressively structured real transaction is actually quite easy to identify if
67. Gunn, supra note 4, at 160. Peter Canellos offers a similar definition: an abusive
transaction is one which produces "a gross departure from sensible economic results and
the fundamental tax principles underlying the Code." Canellos, supra note 2, at 69. David
Hariton describes the same type of rule as being the "essence of the economic substance
doctrine." See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX
LAW. 235, 246 (1999).
68. Under the business purpose doctrine, the taxpayer must have a reason for under-
taking a transaction other than the avoidance of federal taxes. See Treasury White Paper,
supra note 6, at 55. There are several versions of the economic substance doctrine; some of
these are means-oriented and some might be considered outcomes-oriented. Cf id. at 56;
Hariton, supra note 67, at 241, 246; Lee Sheppard, Economic Substance Abuse, 89 TAX
NOTES 1095, 1095 (2000).
69. See Canellos, supra note 2, at 55-57.
70. See id.; Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV.
131, 136 (2001) ("[t]he standards of tax motive and economic substance cast a pall over
some day-to-day tax planning"); David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and
Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 583 (2000) (explaining why one must look beyond the
question of whether the element of "economic substance" is present to whether the result
is abusive); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Treasury's Proposal to Codify the Economic
Substance Doctrine, 88 TAX NOTES 937, 944-45 (2000).
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the totality of the transaction is taken into account.71 Almost in the next
breath, however, he describes the "significant differences between classic
shelter activity and financial product innovation"-with the latter trans-
actions apparently deserving of respect by the tax authorities-in the fol-
lowing terms: "the tax benefits sought in financial products do not
generally involve abuse of the tax system to the same degree as true shel-
ters. Gross sheltering of unrelated income is typically not involved, and
the deductions generated substantially comport with the investor's
return.
'72
The need for so many qualifiers suggests that the distinction between
abusive and non-abusive transactions may be more difficult than Mr.
Canellos lets on. At another point, he explains that the step-down pre-
ferred transaction was properly curtailed by the government because
even though the transaction "probably worked under then-existing
rules[, it] was too good to be true."' 73 Yet Professor Gunn explains that
some "very-favorable tax results, results that may seem too good to be
true, are sometimes required by the language and purpose of particular
statutory provisions" and are not, therefore, negated by the partnership
anti-abuse regulations.74
The potential lack of clarity of an anti-abuse rule can be illustrated by
the facts of Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner.75 In that case, the
U.S. corporate taxpayer purchased and then immediately sold (to the
same person from whom it made the purchase) the equivalent of some
portfolio shares in a Dutch corporation. The sale price was for about $19
million less than the purchase price. During the extremely brief period of
ownership (one hour, at best), however, the taxpayer became entitled to
receive a dividend from the Dutch company. The gross amount of the
dividend was about $22 million but there was a Dutch income tax with-
held from the dividend of about $3 million. Thus, the net amount of the
dividend actually paid to the taxpayer was about $19 million. The tax-
payer carried out virtually the entire transaction through its margin ac-
count and incurred transactions costs of about $1.5 million consisting of a
$1 million fee to the promoter and $500,000 in interest to the lending
institution.
The pre-tax result to the taxpayer was about a $1.5 million loss: the $19
million net dividend almost exactly offset the $19 million loss on the sale
of the stock, but the taxpayer still incurred the $1.5 million in costs. Ac-
cording to the position taken by the taxpayer, however, the transaction
71. See Canellos, supra note 2, at 51 ("experienced tax professionals can usually read-
ily distinguish tax shelters from real transactions"). Professor Gergen says something simi-
lar: "Good tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge of the envelope."
Gergen, supra note 70, at 136.
72. See Canellos, supra note 2, at 55 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 54.
74. Gunn, supra note 4, at 174 (emphasis added).
75. 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
2001]
SMU LAW REVIEW




loss on sale of stock- (19.0M)
transaction costs- (1.5M)
net income- $ 1.5M
tax from transaction (0.5M) 77
foreign tax credit for Dutch withholding tax- 3.OM
after-tax result- $1.0M
The Tax Court denied the taxpayer's claim for the foreign tax credit and
also assessed negligence penalties against the taxpayer.78
Many people view Compaq as an example of the current crop of corpo-
rate tax shelters. 79 Certainly, the court found little merit in the taxpayer's
claim. But would the taxpayer's position be rejected by the anti-abuse
rule described earlier? At one level, the answer to that question seems
easy. The taxpayer incurred almost no risk (ownership of the stock was
for at most one hour, and the purchase and resale were arranged from the
start) and committed almost no capital (the purchase was financed by
borrowed funds, and the borrowing cost is included in the pre-tax and
after-tax results), yet according to the taxpayer, it was entitled to convert
a $1.5 million pre-tax loss into a $1.0 million after-tax gain. One might
fairly assume that a sensible legislator would think this result to be too
good to be true, and therefore impermissible.
Yet on further reflection, the answer may not be so easy after all. What
made the transaction work was Compaq's ability to purchase stock whose
price had not capitalized the value of the foreign tax credit. The stock
price fell by only $19 million, the net after-tax value of the dividend, with-
out any consideration for the creditable nature of the Dutch tax. This
was a perfectly reasonable market response for Dutch shareholders not
entitled to any foreign tax credit. But it was a potential boon for share-
holders like Compaq which were entitled to one.
In other words, Compaq tried to take advantage of a market situation
not unlike that of a top-bracket taxpayer purchasing tax-exempt bonds
76. These figures assume that both the capital loss and the $1.5 million in costs were
immediately deductible. The taxpayer had a sizable capital gain that was sheltered by the
capital loss. If the transaction costs were not immediately deductible, the after-tax gain
would be less than what is shown in the text but the point would remain the same.
77. For computational ease, I have assumed the taxpayer paid taxes equal to one-third
of its net income from the transaction.
78. 113 T.C. at 219. For taxable years subsequent to the ones in issue in Compaq,
section 901(k) would bar the taxpayer's entitlement to a foreign tax credit in the circum-
stances of that case.
79. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magin, From Shelters to Hookers, 1999 Was a Lively Year in the
Courts, 86 TAX NoTEs 22, 22 (2000); Shaviro, supra note 59, at 226-28; Lee Sheppard,
Courts Combat Corporate Tax Shelters, 85 TAX NoTEs 137 (1999).
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whose price and yield have not fully capitalized the tax benefit to such
taxpayer.80 Would such a purchase be violative of the anti-abuse rule?
To muddy the question further, suppose some of the worst smelling
aspects of the Compaq transaction were eliminated. Suppose Compaq
purchased on the market some shares in a Dutch utility company, or per-
haps some high-quality Dutch preferred stock, and held the shares for a
few months before selling them, again on the market. Suppose, as ex-
pected, the additional period of ownership did not result in any signifi-
cant economic risk being borne by Compaq, and the pricing of the shares
and all other facts turned out to be the same as in the actual case. Should
Compaq be permitted to claim the foreign tax credit in this situation de-
spite the existence of an anti-abuse rule? Wouldn't the "too good to be
true" aspect of the transaction still be present? 81
The lack of clarity of an anti-abuse rule weakens its utility as a weapon
against corporate tax shelters. Aside from the problem of possibly apply-
ing to erroneous cases, an unclear rule may actually lead to more aggres-
sive tax planning by taxpayers. This is because of the comparative
resource advantage that taxpayers -particularly the large corporate tax-
payers participating in corporate tax shelter activity-have over the gov-
ernment. Thus, taxpayers may reasonably expect to gain more from the
uncertainty than the government. 82
Finally, an unclear rule lacks transparency. Taxpayers may reasonably
object to whether the rule is applied in a sufficiently even-handed man-
ner.83 As Professor Cooper notes, this is a common complaint of statu-
80. See Shaviro, supra note 59, at 225. For example, a taxpayer in the 40% marginal
tax bracket who purchases a tax-exempt state or local bond which has only capitalized the
tax benefits obtained by a taxpayer in the 30% bracket captures a portion of the federal
subsidy intended for the state or local jurisdiction.
81. David Hariton argues that this revised transaction should not be considered abu-
sive because the taxpayer is crediting foreign taxes under circumstances where Congress
intended the credits to be available. In contrast, he asserts that where the taxpayer's own-
ership is too fleeting (as in the actual case), the foreign tax credit should be unavailable
because Congress did not intend credits in that situation. See Hariton, supra note 70, at
609-12. But should the foreign tax credit be denied if the taxpayer's ownership is fleeting
yet the stock price does capitalize the value of the credit? What would be abusive in that
situation?
82. See Weisbach, supra note 59; Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and
Corporate Tax Management, 51 TAX EXEC. 235, 242 (1999).
83. See Kleinbard, supra note 82, at 235 ("an emphasis on standards would signifi-
cantly undermine our rule-based system by interjecting an unacceptably high degree of
arbitrariness into the process, which would ultimately corrode the most important aspect of
our corporate tax system-the sense of its underlying fairness"); Kenneth W. Gideon, As-
sessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 81 TAX NoTEs 999, 1001 (1998)
("[a]ntiabuse rules transfer [the] decision making process [of whether a tax benefit will be
allowed] from the open and uniform arena of rulemaking to the uncertainties of the audit
process and virtually assure that the results will vary from taxpayer to taxpayer."). Mr.
Canellos asserts that there is a sharp distinction between the "tax bar" and the "tax shelter
bar" and that "[i]t is inconceivable that a practitioner who specialized in tax shelters would
ever reach a position of responsibility in [the leading tax bar] organizations." Canellos,
supra note 2, at 56. His position suggests a possible safe harbor: a client represented by a
past or current tax bar leader would have the tax consequences of the client's transactions
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tory general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs). 84 But the standard response
to this criticism-reassurance that the GAAR will rarely be used and will
only apply to the most blatant and contrived cases 8 5-is of no help in our
search for a section 469 clone. If the anti-abuse rule is so watered down
that it becomes, in Prof. Cooper's words, "just another part of the tax
landscape which practitioners and the judiciary [must] negotiate," 86 then,
sadly, enactment of the rule will have been just another move in the T.A.
game. 8
7
B. TAXING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS ON THEIR ADJUSTED
BOOK INCOME
Consider the following rule: suppose public corporations are taxed
each year on the amount of income they report for financial accounting
purposes, as adjusted by tax rules authorizing specific deviations from a
book income tax base. Thus, the starting tax base for public corporations
would be their reported book income, but specific provisions could mod-
ify that result. If, for example, Congress deemed it desirable to allow
different depreciation rules for book and tax purposes,88 different conse-
quences from the exercise of nonqualified stock options,89 different treat-
ment of foreign income, 90 or any other book-tax differences, Congress
insulated from a challenge based on the anti-abuse rule. If nothing else, such a rule would
certainly spur interest and participation in bar activities!
84. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 114; see also Gergen, supra note 70, at 131-32.
85. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 93.
86. Id. at 85.
87. The experience with the partnership anti-abuse regulations seems to have followed
exactly this pattern. Originally proposed with some real bite, they have become so watered
down in their final version that they are, in some respects, "quite pro-taxpayer." Gunn,
supra note 4, at 174. See T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109, 110-11 for a description of the
changes made to the proposed version of the regulations, including the addition of a num-
ber of examples illustrating transactions protected from challenge. For the proposed ver-
sion of the regulations, see PS-27-94, 1994-1 C.B. 832. Professor Gunn identifies several
transactions which are treated by the regulations as nonabusive even though the taxpayers
obtain "significant tax benefits ... without good business reasons for doing so." Gunn,
supra note 4, at 167. He concludes that "[t]he antiabuse regulations seem destined to play
no part in the affairs of most partnerships." Id. at 173. See also Cooper, supra note 1, at
127 (explaining how infrequently the GAAR has been applied in Australia and Canada
and how inconsequential it has sometimes proven to be).
88. Corporations are currently permitted to use different depreciation methods for
these two purposes. See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, 1999-2 EDITION,
C4.02[2][e] (Frank C. Minter et al., eds. 1999-2 ed.) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING
HANDBOOK].
89. In general, the corporate issuer of a nonqualified stock option is entitled to deduct
for tax purposes the difference between the value of the stock at the time of the option's
exercise and the option's exercise price. See I.R.C. § 83(h). In contrast, corporations are
generally not required to reduce their earnings for financial accounting purposes by this
difference as long as the exercise price of the option is at least equal to the value of the
stock at the time the option is granted. See Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation,
SFAS No. 123; Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, APB No. 25.
90. The consolidation of foreign subsidiaries with their domestic parents are currently
treated differently for tax and accounting purposes. In general, a foreign subsidiary may
not be included in the consolidated income tax return of a U.S. parent. See I.R.C.
§ 1504(b)(4). In contrast, the financial results of a foreign subsidiary are generally in-
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would simply have to enact the particular adjustment. In the absence of
any adjustment, however, a public corporation would pay tax on its book
income. The potential advantage of shifting to a book income tax base
with adjustments is to improve the transparency of the tax base: intended
deviations from book income, but only intended deviations, would be
permitted in calculating taxable income. 91 A complete discussion of this
possible change in the law will have to await a future article, but some
preliminary thoughts are outlined below.
1. Effect on Corporate Tax Shelters
According to the Treasury Department, a principal characteristic of
corporate tax shelters is inconsistent treatment for financial accounting
and tax purposes of the items resulting from the shelter. A shelter might
be designed, for example, to produce a tax loss without any correspond-
ing book loss. Indeed, public corporations generally do not find appeal-
ing tax shelters which result in consistent book-tax treatment because of
the adverse effect of such shelters on their reported earnings. Although
there is limited disclosure required of book-tax disparities for both tax
and accounting purposes, the great number of differences permits much
shelter activity to remain hidden from view.92
The entire class of shelters with this common characteristic would end
if corporations were taxed on their adjusted book income. 93 By linking
taxable income to book income, Congress would eliminate the ability of
corporations to explore unintended and undesirable deviations between
the two measures. Congress would gain greater control over the corpo-
rate tax base; intended book-tax disparities could be specifically author-
ized but unintended ones would essentially end.94 The rule would have
similar characteristics to section 469: it would be broad, reasonably clear,
and very outcomes-oriented, with tax consequences literally being deter-
mined by the "bottom line." Tax results would not depend upon taxpayer
intent, motive, or similar factors.
cluded in the results of its U.S. parent so long as the parent owns over 50 percent of the
subsidiary. See AccoUNTING HANDBOOK, supra note 88, at C13.01[1].
91. This procedure would also make plain Congress's control over the definition of the
corporate income tax base. Cf Treasury White Paper, supra note 6, at 119 (expressing
concern that a book income adjustment would result in Congress ceding some of its au-
thority to other bodies such as the AICPA, FASB, and the SEC).
92. See id. at 14-15; Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83
TAX NOTES 1775, 1785-86 (1999).
93. The rule may not affect, however, Compaq-type shelters involving the possible
inappropriate claiming of credits. Cf. James B. Mackie III, The Puzzling Comeback of the
Corporate Income Tax: Why Have Tax Payments Increased While the Average Tax Rate Has
Declined During the 1990s?,. 1999 PROCEEDNGS OF THE NAT'L TAX ASSN. (forthcoming)
(questions whether book-tax differences of corporate tax shelters is reason for decline in
corporate average tax rate).
94. The failure to distinguish between intended and unintended tax benefits is a com-
mon criticism of the passive activity loss rules. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 61, at 103;
Zelenak, supra note 64, at 520-24. It is also a frequently expressed concern regarding cur-
rent anti-corporate tax shelter proposals. See Canellos, supra note 2; Hariton, supra note
67, at 273; Hariton, supra note 70, at 613.
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2. Tax Policy Considerations
Aside from its possible impact on corporate tax shelters, is the rule
consistent with sound tax policy? The rule requires public corporations
to be taxed more closely on their economic income, if one assumes that
income reported for financial accounting purposes is a closer approxima-
tion of that than taxable income. 95 But how does the rule compare to
current law from the standpoint of equity, efficiency, and administrative
simplicity?
It is hard to assess the equity implications of the rule because they de-
pend upon identifying who bears the burden of the corporate tax. For
example, if corporation X pays more tax under the proposal than under
current law, it is difficult to determine whether that result is equitable
without knowing who bears the burden of X's tax liability.
An efficiency objection arises if the rule is not even-handed in its appli-
cation. Because corporations to some extent can manage the amount of
financial earnings they report in a given year, a tax base based on book
income would seem to violate a neutrality objective. Such a rule could
allow similarly situated corporations to pay different amounts of tax, de-
pending upon the earnings they decide to report in a given year.
On the other hand, to the extent reported earnings make a difference
to investors-obviously, an uncertain assumption-financial accounting
policy should promote uniform treatment of corporations. Thus, al-
though the amount of earnings are to some degree manipulable by corpo-
rate management, similarly situated corporations may have an equal
opportunity to engage in such manipulations. If this is true, then part of
the efficiency objection should disappear. A corporation's choice regard-
ing how it balances its desire to report high financial earnings and low
taxable income would be similar to other choices it faces in operating its
business.96 Tax rates can be adjusted to raise the desired amount of reve-
nue based on the amount of earnings reported.
To be sure, certain corporations, particularly those in different indus-
tries, would no doubt have differing abilities to engage in earnings man-
agement. Thus, a tax based on adjusted book income would cause some
distortion and inefficiency. What is unknown is whether this distortion
would be greater than that of current law, which also taxes some corpora-
tions in different industries in different ways.97
95. See U.S. J. Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
JCS-10-87, 434 (Comm. Print 1987) (reason for inclusion of book income tax preference in
corporate minimum tax was to tax corporate economic income and to restore public confi-
dence in the fairness of the tax system).
96. This position is consistent with Professor Gergen's assertion that "[f]rom an alloca-
tive perspective the evil in exploitative tax planning lies more in the effort spent in playing
the game than in the outcome." Gergen, supra note 70, at 145. If corporations have an
equal opportunity to engage in tax shelter planning, then the principal efficiency objection
of shelters may be the transactions costs to the taxpayers and the IRS.
97. For example, see I.R.C. subchapters H (special tax rules for banking institutions), I
(natural resources), and L (insurance companies).
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Moreover, balanced against that inefficiency would be the potential
simplification gain from a tax on adjusted book income. The planning,
compliance and administration costs of the current corporate tax are
quite high. 98 Tying taxable income to the amount of book income, even
with a number of authorized adjustments, could be a major simplification
and result in a reduction in costs. 99
3. Accounting Policy Considerations
A tax based on adjusted book income would motivate some corpora-
tions to report lower earnings simply to reduce their tax bill. Thus, the
tax might have the adverse effect of degrading the quality of financial
reporting. 100 On the other hand, financial reporting is already degraded
to some extent. Under current law, corporations obtain two different
bites at the apple: they take advantage of ambiguities in the financial ac-
counting rules to puff up the amount of their financial earnings, and take
advantage of similar ambiguities in the tax rules to understate the amount
of their taxable earnings. Further, they lobby Congress and the relevant
administrative agencies to maintain and enlarge the ambiguities in each
set of rules. Linking tax consequences more closely to book conse-
quences eliminates one of those opportunities. Although adoption of the
tax rule discussed here may ultimately result in lower reported earnings,
it may be that such reports will represent more reliable assessments of the
financial situations of the corporations than are currently provided.
4. Limitation to Public Companies
The tax on adjusted book income would only apply to public compa-
nies because of the potential discipline imposed by public markets on the
amount of corporate earnings reported. But there is another reason to
98. See U.S. GAO, Tax System Burden: Tax Compliance Burden Faced by Business
Taxpayers (1994), GAO/T-GGD-95-42; David R. Seltzer, Federal Income Tax Compliance
Costs: A Case Study of Hewlett-Packard Company, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1997); Joel B.
Slemrod & Marsha Blumenthal, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business, 24 PUB.
FIN. Q. 411 (1996).
99. See Seltzer, supra note 98, at 492 ("strong links between the company's tax report-
ing systems and its general ledger are an important factor in mitigating the overall compli-
ance burden. Conversely, when those links are absent, compliance costs increase
markedly."); compare Thomas M. Porcano et al., Alignment of Taxable Income with Ac-
counting Profit, 10 AusTL. TAX F. 475, 500-01 (1993) (questioning whether system would
be simpler). The Treasury concluded that a similar proposal would add significant com-
plexity. Treasury's proposal, however, would use book income as a floor in the computa-
tion of a corporation's taxable income, similar to the book income adjustment in effect for
1987 through 1989 for purposes of the corporate minimum tax. Thus, Treasury's proposal
would add an additional requirement to all of the complexity of current law. In contrast,
the proposal described in the text would substitute a new system for much of current law's
complexity. See Treasury White Paper, supra note 6, at 116-19.
100. See Calvin Johnson, GAAP Tax, 83 TAX NoTEs 425, 427 (1999). However, a re-
cent study of the 1987-89 period, when corporate taxes were linked to reported book in-
come through application of the corporate minimum tax, questions the degree of earnings
management undertaken by corporations in response to that law. See Won W. Choi et al.,
Potential Errors in Detection of Earnings Management: Reexamining Studies Investigating
the AMT of 1986 (2000) (unpublished paper).
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limit the proposal to public corporations-they probably represent the
heart of the corporate tax shelter problem. According to the Treasury
Department, the principal benefit of corporate tax shelters is the saving
in corporate income taxes. 101 Yet the very largest corporations, which are
disproportionately public companies, pay the bulk of the corporate tax
and therefore are likely to be the major players in corporate shelters. 10 2
Private corporations taxed under subchapter C have many opportunities
unavailable to public corporations to reduce or eliminate their corporate
income by paying out their earnings in tax-deductible ways.
103
Moreover, under the check-the-box entity classification rules, new pri-
vate ventures have an enhanced ability to avoid the corporate tax alto-
gether in the future. This option is unavailable to public firms.10 4 Thus,
the existing difference between public and private companies for tax pur-
poses affords an excellent opportunity to consider reforms that take ad-
vantage of the unique features of the firms in each sector to determine
the simplest, most efficient way of raising taxes from that sector.
105
5. Integration
The proposed rule redefines the corporate tax base. Most major corpo-
rate integration proposals retain some form of corporate tax, with the
shareholder tax being reduced or eliminated in some way.106 Thus, the
proposal could be implemented consistently with almost any integration
objective.
101. See Treasury White Paper, supra note 6, at 25.
102. In 1997, there were 9,017 corporations with $250 million or more in assets, the
largest asset category segregated by the IRS, out of a total of 4.71 million corporations and
2.26 million non-subchapter S corporations. Although these largest corporations repre-
sented only approximately 0.4 percent of all non-subchapter S corporations, they paid
$143.5 billion in corporate tax, or 77.9 percent of the total corporate tax of $184.2 billion
that year. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, CORPORA-
TION SOURCE BOOK 1997, Publ'n 1053 at 9, 481 (2000). See also John W. Lee, A Populist
Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers
Never Do", 78 TEXAS L. REV. 885, 903-08 (2000). For data indicating that public corpora-
tions fall disproportionately among the higher asset-size categories, see GEORGE K. YIN &
DAVID J. SHAKOW, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXA-
TION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES-REPORTERS' STUDY, 150-51 (1999) [hereinafter
ALl REPORTERS' STUDY]; See also Bankman, supra note 92, at 1784 ("majority of tax
shelters are purchased by corporations with diffuse ownership interests").
103. See Lee, supra note 102, at 918.
104. See I.R.C. § 7704(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(7) (public firm ineligible to make
entity classification election).
105. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 102, for a discussion of how the taxation
of private firms might be reformed.
106. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND COR-
PORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND





For U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries, the principal question
will be how to reconcile the different consolidation standards that cur-
rently exist for tax and accounting purposes. The tax rules could be con-
formed to the accounting rules, in which case U.S. corporations would be
taxed currently on the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries. 10 7 Alterna-
tively, a specific book-tax deviation could be enacted to continue the cur-
rent U.S. tax treatment of those earnings.
Taxing foreign corporations with U.S. operations would be a little trick-
ier. If the domestic operations were carried out through a separate sub-
sidiary, the subsidiary could be required to prepare financial statements
in accordance with U.S. financial accounting rules and report U.S. taxable
income accordingly. The same requirement might be imposed even if the
domestic operations were carried out through a U.S. branch. Alterna-
tively, the foreign parent corporation might be required to report its
earnings using international accounting standards, with the U.S. portion
of those earnings then being taxed by the U.S.
7. Summary
Much has been written about the evolution of the corporate tax depart-
ment from being a mere part of the overhead to a profit center.10 8 In
truth, well-run corporations have long viewed taxes as a cost which,
within limits, should be minimized. Sharp tax accountants and lawyers
have presumably always been valued corporate employees and advisors.
What may be different, perhaps, is the extent to which corporations are
now willing to go to achieve their tax minimization objectives. Fueled by
rumors of a competitor's latest tax saving plan that aggressively exploits
one of the many complex and possibly irrational features of the corporate
tax law, corporate officers apparently feel more and more compelled to
engage in the T.A. game.109 An adjusted book income tax may both sim-
plify the law, thereby reducing the number of tax law opportunities that
can be exploited, and make the remaining competition more open. Cor-
porate executives would be able to have confidence that a competitor's
reporting of higher earnings is not simply financed by some tax avoidance
scheme not availed of by their own company; rather, the earnings would
be accompanied by a tax bill commensurate to the amount reported.
107. Some commentators support this outcome, quite apart from any consideration of
corporate tax shelters or a possible adjusted book income tax. See Robert J. Peroni et al.,
Getting Serious about Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU
L. REV. 455 (1999).
108. See Treasury White Paper, supra note 6, at 28-29; Bankman, supra note 92, at 1784.
109. See Bankman, supra note 92; Kleinbard, supra note 82, at 235 ("[c]orporate tax
shelters ... [are] a demand-driven phenomenon ... [which] trend is irreversible and will




What should be done about corporate tax shelters? The first thing to
do is to evaluate carefully the scope and severity of the problem. Despite
mounting anecdotal evidence of a problem, the evidence is still only anec-
dotal. We need to understand better the exact nature of the problem and
how widespread it is.
Assuming that the problem is as serious as some claim, Congress
should give meaningful consideration to a bold response. The history of
the last major wave of tax shelter activity in this country lends ample
evidence to how counterproductive incremental reform can be. Small
steps may lead simply to more avoidance behavior and greater ineffi-
ciency, and may leave behind much harm to the tax system even after the
fight against tax shelters is over.
What type of bold response would be appropriate? This article has
suggested searching for a solution with the same characteristics as section
469-a broad, reasonably clear, outcomes-oriented rule that is unaffected
by taxpayer purpose or intent, or the other elements making up the tax-
payer's transaction. One possible solution is enactment of an "anti-
abuse" rule which denies a particular tax result if no sensible legislator
would have approved of the result at the time the statute was drafted.
The uncertainty of such a rule, however, would likely undermine its abil-
ity to be an effective deterrent to corporate tax shelters. The other possi-
ble solution explored in this article, which deserves further consideration,
is to tax public corporations on their income reported for financial ac-
counting purposes, as adjusted by tax rules authorizing specific deviations
from that base. This solution should eliminate an entire class of shelter
transactions. It may also greatly simplify the law and provide much
needed transparency to the process of determining corporate income tax
liabilities.
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